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SELF-INCRIMINATION
U.S. CONST. amend. V:
No person shall ... be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself.
N.Y. CoNw. art. , § 6:
No person shall ... be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself.
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION
FIRST DEPARTMENT
Prudential Securities Incorporated v. Brigianos'
(decided September 30, 1997)
A non-party appellant2 claimed that compliance with a
subpoena duces tecum,3 would violate his right against self-
incrimination under the Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution4 and Article I, section 6 of the New York State
Constitution.5 The Supreme Court, New York County, denied
233 A.D.2d 18, 622 N.Y.S.2d 484 (1st Dep't 1997).
2 Id. at 20, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 485. The non-party appellant was the father-in-
law of the defendant, Paul Brigianos. Id.
3 BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1426 (6th ed. 1990). A subpoena duces tecwn
is defined as "a court process, initiated by a party in litigation, compelling
production of certain specific documents and other items, material and relevant
to facts in issue in a pending judicial proceeding, which documents are in
custody and control of person or body served with process." Id.
4 U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment provides in pertinent part:
"No person shall... be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law .... " Id.
5 N.Y. CONST. art. I, §6. This section provides in pertinent part: "No
person shaU... be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
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portions of non-party appellant's motion to quash the subpoena
duces tecum.6  The Appellate Division, First Department,
reversed the decision of the lower court and granted the motion to
quash the subpoena duces tecum, holding that the act of
producing the evidence can trigger the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination.7
Plaintiff, Prudential Securities Incorporated [hereinafter
"Prudential"] claimed that the defendant, Paul Brigianos
[hereinafter "Brigianos"] had purchased 22,500 shares of stock
in Hamilton Bancorp Incorporated [hereinafter "Hamilton"] and
later failed to pay the purchase price of $769,884.00.8 In
response, Prudential liquidated the stock at a loss of over
$125,000. 9  Brigianos refused to reimburse Prudential, and
denied ever placing the orders for the Hamilton stock.1"
Accordingly, Prudential filed suit against Brigianos for breach of
contract. 1
Thereafter, Prudential served a subpoena duces tecum upon the
non-party appellant requesting inter alia: "all documents
reflecting non-party appellant's purchases and sales of Hamilton
shares ... all documents reflecting Brigianos' purchases and
sales of Hamilton stock and ... all documents relating to any
agreement (i.e. loans) between non-party appellant and defendant
6 Prudential, 233 A.D.2d at 20-21, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 485.
7 Id. at 23, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 487. The court held that "non-party appellant's
act of production pursuant to the order of the subpoena would implicate his
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, and thus non-party
appellant's motion to quash should have been granted." Id.
8 Id. at 19, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 484. Prudential asserts that Bregianos made two
unsolicited telephone calls to them on June 29 and June 30, 1994, to place
orders for the Hamilton stock. Id.
I Id. After unsuccessfully attempting to secure the money owed for the stock
purchases from Brigianos, Prudential was compelled to liquidate Brigianos'
account. Id.
10 Id. Initially Brigianos denied that he purchased the Hamilton stock, but at
a subsequent deposition, Brigianos admitted that he owned 23,300 shares of
Hamilton stock as of June 24, 1994. Id. at 19, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 485.
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concerning a purchase or sale of Hamilton shares."12 These
documents were requested by Prudential to establish that
Brigianos had purchased the stock, and to discredit Brigianos by
showing that non-party appellant had advised Brigianos to
purchase the stock and loaned him the money to consummate the
deal.'
3
Four months later, the Security and Exchange Commission
[hereinafter "SEC"] also served a subpoena duces tecum upon
the non-party appellant, requesting "all documents relating to his
trading of Hamilton shares, pursuant to an SEC investigation of
insider trading by non-party appellant." 14 In accordance with the
subpoena, the non-party appellant appeared before the SEC, and
asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege." The non-party
appellant then moved in the New York County, Supreme Court,
to quash the Prudential subpoena on Fifth Amendment grounds,
given the pendency of the SEC investigation. 16 The court denied
the portions of the motion relating to the non-party appellant's
trade and loan documents, reasoning that these documents
"constituted regular business records that would normally be
expected to be in non-party appellant's possession and control,
and the production thereof would not implicate any testimonial
significance." 7 In contrast, the court held in abeyance that part
12Id. at 20, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 485.
13 Id. Kenneth Rosato, a stock broker at Janney Montgomery Scott, testified
that non-party appellant and Brigianos together with their wives, had Janney
Montgomery Scott accounts containing 107,000 shares of Hamilton stock. Id.
Moreover, Kenneth Rosato testified that Brigianos borrowed $68,000 from
non-party appellant in order to purchase the Hamilton stock. Id.
11 Id. The investigation by the SEC was disclosed to the lower court in an
affirmation by non-party appellant's counsel which was "submitted under
seal." Id. Although the current investigation by the SEC was for civil
violations, non-party appellant asserted that "such alleged violations would
also potentially constitute a Federal felony, and that such cases often are
referred by the SEC to the United States Attorney's office for criminal
prosecution." Id.
15 Id. Although, non-party appellant appeared before the SEC, he did not
produce the requested documents or testify. Id.
16 id.
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of the motion relating to production of Brigianos' trading
records, reasoning that the non-party appellant could face
prosecution for insider trading due to such disclosure. 8
Accordingly, non-party appellant appealed to the Appellate
Division, First Department, arguing that his compliance with the
subpoena duces tecum compelling production of his trade and
loan documents, would violate his Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination.' 9
The court began its analysis by recognizing that the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination protects an
individual from being incriminated by his own compelled
testimony. 20 However, if a person voluntarily prepares his own
business records, then the contents of those records are not
considered compelled testimony and thus, are not privileged.2
Accordingly, in order to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination, one cannot merely argue that the
contents of the documents requested in a subpoena contain
incriminating evidence, whether his own or that of another
person.22 The Prudential court went of to differentiate between
the contents of voluntarily prepared documents and the act of
actually producing those documents.' Relying on Fisher v.
United States,24 the court determined that:
The act of producing evidence in response to a
subpoena nevertheless has communicative aspects of its
own, wholly aside from the contents of the papers
produced. Compliance with the subpoena tacitly
18 Id. at 21, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 485. The court further stated that if after the
conclusion of the SEC investigation there were no criminal charges filed
against non-party appellant, then non-party appellant would be compelled to
produce Brigianos' trading records. Id.
' Id. Non-party appellant appealed from the order of the Supreme Court,
New York County, entered on August 15, 1996, which denied portions of non-
party appellant's motion to quash. Id. at 24, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 487.
20Id.
21 Id. (citing Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 410 (1976). See also
United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 611-12 (1984)).
2 Id. at 21, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 486 (citing Fisher, 426 U.S. at 410).
23Id.
24 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
[Vol 141238
4
Touro Law Review, Vol. 14 [1998], No. 3, Art. 61
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol14/iss3/61
SELF-INCRIMINATION
concedes the existence of the papers demanded and
their possession or control by the [subpoenaed person].
It also would indicate the [subpoenaed person's] belief
that the papers are those described in the subpoena. 2
Having reached this determination, the court held that in certain
cases, the act of production as opposed to the contents of the
documents produced, can invoke the Fifth Amendment
privilege.'
In Fisher, the United States Supreme Court held that an
attorney could be compelled to furnish the tax documents which
were in the attorney's possession, without violating the taxpayer's
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.' The
Court focused on the testimonial and incriminating nature
inherent in the production of the records and not the contents of
the records themselves.2 The Court determined that the Fifth
Amendment privilege could encompass the act of producing
subpoenaed documents but not under the specific circumstances in
Fisher.29 The Fisher Court recognized that compliance with the
Internal Revenue Service's subpoena would admit three facts: the
existence of the documents, the possession of the documents by
the subpoenaed party and the authentication of the documents as
25 Prudential, 223 A.D.2d at 21-22, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 486 (quoting Fisher,
425 U.S. at 410).
2 Id. at 22, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 486.
27 Fisher, 425 U.S. at 414. In Fisher, taxpayers were under investigation for
possible criminal or civil liability under federal income tax laws. Id. at 393-
94. The taxpayers transferred certain documents relating to their accountants'
preparation of their tax returns to their attorneys. Id. at 394. Thereafter, the
Internal Revenue Service served a summons on the taxpayers attorneys
directing that the accountant's records be produced. Id. The attorneys refused
to comply with the summons, arguing that "enforcement would involve
compulsory self-incrimination of the taxpayers in violation of their Fifth
Amendment privilege, would involve a seizure of the papers without necessary
compliance with the Fourth Amendment, and would violate the taxpayers'
right to communicate in confidence with their attorney." Id. at 395.
8 Id. at 410. The Court held that the "act of producing evidence in response
to a subpoena nevertheless has communicative aspects of its own, wholly aside
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those specified in the subpoena. 30  Nevertheless, in Fisher, the
Court determined that the existence and location of the records
were a "foregone conclusion" and the taxpayer would add little
to the Government's case by conceding possession of the
records.3' Hence, the act of production of the documents in those
specific circumstances was not tantamount to testimony within the
purview of the Fifth Amendment privilege.32
However, the Fisher Court recognized that the circumstances of
another case may lead to a different conclusion with regard to the
Fifth Amendment privilege, especially when the existence of the
subpoenaed papers was not a "foregone conclusion. "33 Such a
set of circumstances presented themselves in United States v.
Doe.34 In Doe, the owner of sole proprietorships was served with
subpoenas demanding the production of business records in
conjunction with a corruption investigation involving certain
municipal and county contracts.35 Doe moved to quash the
subpoenas, arguing that the compelled production of his business
30 Id. at 410 (citing Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 125 (1957)).
31 Id. at 411. Additionally, the Court analyzed whether the Fifth Amendment
privilege would have protected the tax records if they had remained in the
possession of the taxpayer under the attorney-client privilege. Id. at 403-04.
The Court acknowledged that records privileged in the hands of a taxpayer
remain privileged when transferred to a taxpayer's attorney for the purpose of
seeking legal advice. Id. at 405
32 Id. at 411. Additionally, the Court noted that the tax documents were
prepared by the accountant and that they were prepared voluntarily without
coercion. Id. at 409-10. Therefore, the Court held that the tax records would
not have been protected even in the hands of the taxpayer because the tax
records did not constitute compelled testimony. Id.
13 Id. at 410.
" 465 U.S. 605 (1984).
31 Id. at 606. The grand jury served five subpoenas on Doe. Id. The first
two subpoenas demanded production of telephone records and records
pertaining to four bank accounts, the third subpoena demanded a list of almost
all of the business records of one of Doe's companies, the fourth demanded
production of a similar list of another one of Doe's companies, and the fifth
subpoena demanded canceled checks and bank statements of two of Doe's
companies located in the Grand Cayman Islands. Id. at 606-07.
1240 [Vol 14
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records infringed upon his Fifth Amendment rights. 6 The district
court found that the act of producing the business records
involved testimonial self-incrimination,37  reasoning that
enforcement of the subpoena would compel Doe to admit the
existence of the records, admit the possession of the records and
admit the authenticity of the records. 38  The Court of Appeals
agreed and the United States Supreme Court accepted these
findings. 39  The United States Supreme Court, applying the
principles embodied in Fisher, held that the contents of the
business records were not privileged because they were
voluntarily prepared.' Nevertheless, the Court found that the act
361 Id. at 607. The Government argued that Doe's act of production of these
records would not be used against him in any way and urged the Court to grant
constructive use immunity pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002 and 6003. Id. at
616. Under the doctrine of constructive use immunity, the Court could require
the Government "not to use the incriminatory aspects of the act of production
against the person claiming the privilege. ... " Id. The decision whether to
seek use immunity "necessarily involves a balancing of the Government's
interest in obtaining information against the risk that immunity will frustrate
the Government's attempts to prosecute the subject of the investigation." Id.
However, without a formal request by the United States Attorney, the statute
does not grant that authority to the Court. Id. Accordingly, the Court
declined to grant the immunity to Doe where the Government did not make the
formal request that the statute requires. Id.
37 Id. at 613.
31 Id. at 613 n.11. The Government argued that the possession, existence
and authentication of the records could be proven without Doe's testimonial
communication. Id. However, the District Court rejected this argument
concluding that the Government was unable to demonstrate how those
representations could be implemented so to protect Doe in subsequent
proceedings. Id. Accordingly, the District Court held that the
communications would violate Doe's Fifth Amendment rights. Id.
39 Id. at 613-14. The Court of Appeals determined that the Government did
not know with certainty that the documents specified in the subpoena were in
the possession and control of Doe. Id. at 613-14 n. 12. The court inferred that
the Government was unable to prove the existence of the subpoenaed
documents or whether Doe was connected to the businesses under investigation
and therefore they served a broad sweeping subpoena on Doe, requiring him to
become the main informant against himself. Id.
I Id. at 611-12. See also Fisher, 425 U.S. at 432 (Marshal, J., concurring).
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of producing these records may have testimonial and self-
incriminating aspects and was therefore privileged under the Fifth
Amendment.41
Unlike the documents in Fisher, in the instant case, the location
and existence of the documents subpoenaed by Prudential was not
a "foregone conclusion." 42 Following the reasoning in In re
Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum,43 the Prudential court
determined that Prudential lacked knowledge of the location and
existence of these subpoenaed documents.' Accordingly, the
court held that Prudential was seeking to elicit compelled
testimony from the non-party appellant through the use of a
subpoena duces tecum, such compelled testimony being violative
of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution.4s
The facts in In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum may be
distinguished from the facts in Prudential. In In re Grand Jury
Subpoena Duces Tecum, pursuant to a federal securities
investigation, the SEC served Doe with a subpoena demanding
[T]he promise of the Court's theory lies in its innovative
discernment that production may also verify the documents'
very existence and present possession by the producer. This
expanded recognition of the kinds of testimony inherent in
production not only rationalizes the cases, but seems to me to
afford almost complete protection against compulsory
production of our most private papers.
Id.
4' Doe, 465 U.S. at 617.
4 Prudential v. Brigianos, 233 A.D.2d 18, 22, 662 N.Y.S.2d 484, 486
(1st Dep't 1997).
" In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 1 F.3d 87, 93 (2d Cir. 1993),
cert. denied sub nom., Doe v. United States, 510 U.S. 1091 (1994).
4Prudential, 233 A.D.2d at 22, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 486. Petitioner was not
seeking to obtain trading records from Prudential or Janney Montgomery Scott
which it already had in its possession; instead, petitioner was seeking non-
party appellant's personal trading records of which they "had no knowledge
either to their existence or their location." Id.
45 Id. at 22-23, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 486. The court stated that non-party
appellant's production of these statements may incriminate him under the
circumstances "since the scope of the SEC investigation includes whether non-
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the production of certain documents, including "[d]esk calendars,
diaries and appointment books kept by him or on his behalf."
Doe complied with the subpoena and produced a photocopy of his
calendar. 47  Thereafter, at the request of the United States
Attorney, the grand jury issued a subpoena directing Doe to
produce the original calendar.48 Doe refused to produce the
calendar claiming that "the contents of the calendar, as well as
the act of producing it, were protected by the Fifth
Amendment." 49  The Second Circuit held that the contents of
Doe's calendar were not protected by the Fifth Amendment
46 In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 1 F.3d at 89. Doe had
previously testified before the SEC regarding the "trading of securities in his
personal brokerage accounts." Id.
47 Id. These documents were submitted to the SEC along with a letter from
Doe's attorney stating in pertinent part:
We claim that all materials provided... are entitled to
confidential treatment. Because such documents constitute
investigatory records obtained by the Commission in
connection with a potential law enforcement proceeding, they
certainly are subject, at least at the present, to the exemption
from mandatory disclosure under... the Freedom of
Information Act .... Accordingly, we expect that all copies
of documents produced in connection with the Staff's
investigation, including his letter, will be kept in a non-public
file and that access to them by any third party not a member
of the Commission or its Staff will be denied.
Id. Moreover, every page of each document was stamped: "This document is
provided to the United States Securities and Exchange Commission solely for
its use, and neither the document nor its contents may be disclosed to any other
person or entity, pursuant to a claim of confidentiality made by letter dated
JAN 28 1991." Id.
48 Id. During the SEC's investigation, the U.S. Attorney's office requested
access to the Doe documents. Id. The SEC complied with the government's
request. Id. However, upon review of the documents, the government
suspected that the original copy of Doe's calendar had been altered. Id.
Accordingly, a grand jury investigated possible obstruction of justice and
perjury by Doe. Id.
49 Id. Doe also contended that the SEC had breached the confidentiality
agreement it had with him by providing the U.S. Attorney's office with a copy
of the calendar. Id. The District Court agreed holding that Doe's calendar
was an "intimate personal document" and that both the altered and original
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privilege since they had been voluntarily prepared.5"
Furthermore, the court held that "because Doe's compliance with
the subpoena would require mere 'surrender' of the calendar, and
not 'testimony,' Doe has no act of production privilege.""'
In contrast, the Prudential court determined that non-party
appellant's compliance with Prudential's broad subpoena seeking
"any and all documents relating or referring in any manner to
Hamilton" would virtually authenticate and concede the existence
of the documents.52 The court reasoned that in responding to
such a broad subpoena, non-party appellant would have to pick
and choose among the documents in his possession, in order to
identify those called for in the subpoena.53  Hence, non-party
appellant's discretionary act of selecting the documents would in
itself involve testimony and would implicitly authenticate and
concede the possession and existence of the documents, of which
Prudential had no knowledge. 54  Accordingly, non-party
Io Id. at 93. The Court reasoned that the analysis of the self-incrimination
privilege turns on whether the document was voluntarily prepared and whether
the act of production constitutes compulsory testimony. Id. Furthermore, the
Court looked at three other Court of Appeals opinions which held that the Fifth
Amendment did not protect the contents of business or personal records
voluntarily prepared. Id. (citations omitted).
51 Id. at 93-94.
52 Prudential v. Brigianos, 233 A.D.2d 18, 23, 662 N.Y.S.2d 484, 486
(1st Dep't 1997).
53 Id. at 23, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 486-87. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 41
F.3d 377, 380 (8th Cir. 1994). In the matter of In re Grand Jury Proceedings,
a taxpayer's attorney and accountant were served with a subpoena by the
Federal District Court, requesting business and financial records. Id. at 378.
The taxpayers filed a motion to quash the subpoena alleging that compliance
therewith would violate their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination. Id. Additionally, they argued that compliance with the
subpoena would be violative of the attorney-client privilege. Id. The court
held that the act of production of the documents, as distinct from the contents,
would involve "compelled testimonial self-incrimination." Id. at 380. The
court reasoned that since the Government did not introduce evidence that the
documents could be "independently authenticated," the taxpayers act of
producing the documents would prove their authenticity and as such, constitute
compelled testimony violative of the Fifth Amendment. Id.
54 Prudential, 233 A.D.2d at 23, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 486-87 (citing United
States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984)).
1244 [Vol 14
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appellant's act of producing the documents involves compelled
testimony proscribed by the Fifth Amendment of the
Constitution.55
The principle embodied in the federal cases of Fisher, Doe and
In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, have thus been applied
in the New York State case of Prudential.6 When examining the
privilege against self-incrimination embodied in the Federal and
New York State Constitutions, the federal cases distinguished the
contents of the documents from the act of producing the
documents.' The Prudential court applied the principle that
producing a document constitutes compelled testimony because
such an act of production can establish the missing link in a chain
of facts that might incriminate the subpoenaed party. 5
Accordingly, the Federal and New York State courts are in
agreement that if a subpoenaed document provides the causal link
between the defendant and a criminal allegation, then the act of
production itself would constitute compelled testimony violative
of the Federal and New York State Constitutions.
51 Id. at 23, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 487 (finding that "[s]uch disclosure might
incriminate non-party appellant in the SEC investigation for imparting insider
information to another person under circumstances in which it was reasonably
foreseeable that such communication would result in a purchase of securities
by that other person.").
56 Id.
I See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 410-11 (1976); United States v.
Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 612 (1984).
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